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THERE’S NO BEER WITHOUT A SMOKE:
COMMUNITY COHESION AND NEIGHBORING
COMMUNITIES’ EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL
RESISTANCE TO ANTISMOKING REGULATIONS IN THE
DUTCH HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY
TAL SIMONS
Tilburg University
PATRICK A. M. VERMEULEN
JORIS KNOBEN
Radboud University Nijmegen
This study highlights the importance of communities in explaining organizational re-
sistance to institutional pressures. Examining the active resistance of small bars to
smoking regulations in 427 Dutch municipalities (communities), we argue that the
likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressure from a powerful actor is
affected by the social cohesion of the focal community. In addition, we propose a con-
tiguity effect that emphasizes the broader social context of the community—its neigh-
boring communities—as a source for support or information about appropriate ways to
resist such pressures. By incorporating community attributes to account for organiza-
tions’ heterogeneous responses to institutional pressure, the study advances current
institutional scholarship and demonstrates empirically how such a theory can help
explain the success of relatively weak organizational actors’ resistance in the face of
strong institutional pressures by the state—that is, as a result of their embeddedness in
a community.
INTRODUCTION
In line with the European Union (EU)-wide policy
ultimately to attain a smoke-free Europe, the Dutch
government has expanded its tobacco regulations in
recent years, including the implementationof a banon
smoking in bars that took effect in July 2008. While
proponents of smoking regulations have had to fight
hard and long against big interests (e.g., tobacco
growers and tobacco companies), today, there’s a gen-
eral agreement that the campaign has been quite suc-
cessful, at least in some parts of the world (Wolfson,
2001). The implementation of a smoking ban in bars,
however, has ignited fierceoppositionamongmany in
the Netherlands (Nagelhout, van den Putte, de Vries,
Crone, Fong, & Willemsen, 2011). Foremost among
those opposing the new smoking regulations as they
pertained to bars completely banning smoking were
small bar owners, who joined the “Save the Small
Bars” (SSB) foundation, a lead resistance association.
Although not all small bar owners resisted the smok-
ing ban, a large group did—and did so actively.
Moreover, in some regions in the Netherlands, re-
sistance was much fiercer compared to other regions.
In this study, we seek to understand the resistance by
small bars to institutional pressure emanating from
a powerful actor, and argue that their embeddedness
in more cohesive communities significantly sparked
and contributed to their resistance, resulting in a
David-versus-Goliath scenario.
In this paper, we build on earlier research study-
ing the relation between institutional pressures and
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organizational responses (e.g., Doshi, Dowell, &
Toffel, 2013; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons,
1995; Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012; Oliver, 1991).
Previous studies have emphasized the effect of the
nature of the pressure (Oliver, 1991), organiza-
tional attributes (Elbannan & McKinley, 2006;
Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012), industry attributes
(Elbannan & McKinley, 2006), location (Lounsbury,
2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), cost–benefit
considerations (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010), political
dependence (Marquis & Qian, 2014), isomorphic
pressures (Edelman, 1990; Okhmatovskiy & David,
2012), and regional influences (Doshi et al., 2013)
on this relationship. Yet, one particular type of
response—resistance—is not commonly examined
(however, see Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007, and
a few studies on institutional work such as Marti &
Fernandez, 2013;Quirke, 2013).A focus on resistance
to institutional pressures is important because, de-
spite resistance being key to understanding strategic
responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991),
inadequate attention has been devoted to the “re-
sistance of individuals and organizations to field-
level rules, norms and beliefs” (Lawrence, 2008: 179).
Despite the recent emphasis on competing logics
and conflict (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), and studies on the counter-
mobilization efforts by aggrieved actors to protect their
jurisdictions and established practices in the face of
change (Davis,McAdam,Scott,&Zald,2005;Kim,Shin,
Oh, & Jeong, 2007; Levy & Scully, 2007; Lounsbury,
Ventresca,&Hirsch,2003),scholarshave“notexamined
resistance per se” (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007: 800).
Additionally, recent studies in institutional theory
have emphasized the role communities play in driv-
ing organizational activities (Almandoz, 2012; Doshi
et al., 2013; Greenwood, Magan-Diaz, Li, & Lorente,
2010; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008;
Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), high-
lighting the need to further investigate the intersection
between communities and local organizations. Pre-
vious community studies in sociology have mainly
looked at the role of communities and cohesion in re-
lation to crime, poverty, friendship ties, social partici-
pation, social isolation, and a variety of socioeconomic
outcomes (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Moody &White, 2003;
Putnam, 2000; Sampson, 1988, 1991; Small, 2002), but
did not include organizations in their studies. Com-
munity studies utilizing a population ecology per-
spective have incorporated organizations into their
analyses, but have predominantly studied the impact
of local market conditions and communities on orga-
nizational population dynamics (e.g., Carroll & Wade,
1991; Freeman & Audia, 2006; Greve, 2002). In insti-
tutional theory, the influence of communities on
organizations has been demonstrated in relation to
a range of different outcomes, such as corporate phi-
lanthropy (Guthrie, Arum, Roksa, & Damaske, 2008;
Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007), corporate strategy
(Lounsbury, 2007), new foundings (Almandoz, 2012),
or the adoption of newpractices (Davis &Greve, 1997),
andhave focusedinmostcasesonlargecorporations (or
their headquarters), such as mutual funds (Lounsbury,
2007), banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), Fortune
1000 firms (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013), and a variety of
other U.S. corporations (Guthrie et al., 2008).
We depart from these studies by focusing on small,
community embedded organizations that resist in-
stitutional pressure coming from a powerful state
actor.Weposit that thecommunity is anexusof social-
interactional and institutional mechanisms. Because
we are interested in resistance, which, compared to
other forms of organization behavior, requires a cer-
tain level of common values as a fuel for action, we
chose to theoretically focus on community cohesion
first and foremost. While doing so, wewill not ignore,
in the analyses, other community characteristics,
whether examined in the past or not, that may affect
organizations in it. In line withMarquis and Battilana
(2009: 286), we conceptualize communities as “the
populations, organizations, and markets located in
a geographic territory and sharing, as a result of their
common location, elements of local culture, norms,
identity, and laws.” Local communities often main-
tain shared frames of references that affect various
outcomes, including organizational behavior (Brint,
2001). For example, Bielefeld and Corbin (1996)
demonstrated that communities’ “political culture”
exerts institutional pressures via funding decisions
and thus influences the configuration of non-profit
organizations across communities, while Schneiberg,
King, and Smith (2008) showed that some community
characteristics help sustain capacities for resisting
corporate dominance. Studies have also examined
how variations in the characteristics of the embedded
organizations result in their differing responses to
community-level institutional pressures (Greenwood
et al., 2010; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996).
However, knowledge about community-level in-
fluences on organizational responses to institutional
pressures remains somewhat scarce (see alsoMarquis
& Battilana, 2009). Accordingly, we aim to uncover
how organizational resistance is facilitated, affected,
and sustained by community characteristics. Our the-
ory highlights two factors that we argue affect the
likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional
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pressure: one relates to the social fabric, or community
social cohesion, that is created among individuals
within a certain geographical locale, while the other
adds another layer as it considers the contiguityeffects
that bring to the fore the broader social context of the
community. We reason that while, when studying
communities, we should pay close attention to how
the relative stability of their socialmakeup and shared
senseof belonging, commonvalues, anddestinyaffect
organizations’ resistance,weshouldalsonotoverlook
that communities are influenced by neighboring
communities, too, especially in the face of a common
threat. Hence, the search for clues for an appropriate
response is not limited to the community where
a given organization resides, but extends beyond the
boundaries of the locale to neighboring communities
(more than to remote ones). Further, similar organi-
zations facing the same institutional pressure and are
located in different but proximate communities will
cooperate in their resistance.
Our study’s contributions are thus twofold; first, it
contributes to institutional theory by examining the
role of a community-level attribute in influencing the
behavior of organizations. Todate, scant attentionhas
been directed at the actual effect of community pro-
cesses on organizations embedded within the com-
munity. We not only look inside the community to
analyze organizations’ responses to institutional
pressures, but also consider the broader social context
of the community—its neighboring communities—as
a source for signals, clues, or information about ap-
propriate ways to encounter a problem. Second, we
focus on a type of organizational behavior that is in-
frequently studied: resistance.Moreover,weconsider
it in the context of small organizations, whereas most
of the existing literature on organizational resistance
seems to concern larger, powerful firms (Drope &
Hansen, 2006; Elbannan&McKinley, 2006).Weshow
howthe resistanceof small organizationswith limited
resources has led to a situation in which a powerful
actor, the state, was unable to impose the adoption of
new legislation. As a whole, our research contributes
to a layered and more nuanced investigation of in-
stitutional processes with a particular emphasis on
thecounterintuitiveviabilityof small organizations in
the face of a powerful institutional actor.
RESEARCH CONTEXT
More than half a million people die every year in
the European Union as a direct or indirect conse-
quence of smoking (EuropeanCommission, 2007). As
a result,manyEUcountries have introduced smoking
control policies. In general, the underlying reasons
for promoting smoking-free environments and the
resulting practice of smoking bans are far from being
considered contentious among either professionals
or the broader public opinion. The tobacco control
movement has educated the public about the health
risks of tobacco use, attempted to change social
norms, and advanced the development of policies
discouraging the use of tobacco. In contrast, the to-
bacco industry has long denied the harmful conse-
quences of smoking and has persistently tried to
influence legislators accordingly (Wolfson, 2001).
The efforts of the tobacco control movement have
been targeted at the prevention of tobacco use and its
related health risks, and at the protection from ex-
posure to secondhand smoke (Wolfson, 2001). The
movement has initiated smoking-cessation programs,
launched information and education campaigns, and
endeavored to influence the development of policies
related to indoor air quality, youth access to tobacco,
and advertising.At the same time, a countermovement
of industrymanufacturers andotherswhobenefit from
the production of tobacco was mobilized to contest
some of the critiques. The Tobacco Industry Research
Committee, for example, has recruited and funded
more than 1,000 academics and other researchers to
conduct studies that might cast doubt on the relation
between smoking and health issues (Wolfson, 2001).
Despite the power of the tobacco industry, though,
the tobacco controlmovement in Europe has been able
to partly achieve its goals. Smoking rates have de-
creased from 60% to about 25% among adults inmost
European countries, albeitwith considerable variance;
Sweden, Iceland, Slovenia andPortugal allwere found
tohave less than20%of the adult population smoking,
versus Greece (40%) and Bulgaria and Ireland (30%)
(OECD, 2010). However, smoking continues to be
a habit that has not been eliminated, and that many
around the continent still engage in on a daily basis.
Furthermore, although several countries have imple-
mented a variety of smoking control policies and bans,
most “have built comforting loopholes into their anti-
smoking laws,” thus resulting in only a small decline
in the consumption of cigarettes following the in-
troduction of smoking bans (Spinney, 2007: 1507).
Moreover, about a third of Europeans (but, again, with
quite avarianceacross countries) are totallyopposed to
enforcing a smoking ban in bars or pubs.
The Netherlands
In 2002, the Dutch parliament altered the Tobacco
Act to require smoke-free workplaces and public
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transportation, and strengthened enforcement pro-
visions. After intensive lobbying by the hospitality
industry, parliament passed an amendment with the
understanding that thehospitality industrywouldbe
initially exempted, and smoke-free environments
phased in over time (Gonzalez & Glantz, 2011: 4). In
January 2004, the smoke-free workplace legislation
was implemented in all industries except the hos-
pitality industry (Nagelhout et al., 2011).
STIVORO (Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken;
the main tobacco control organization in the Neth-
erlands) and three Dutch non-governmental health
organizations (NGOs) joined forces and decided to
integrate lobbying into their tobacco control activi-
ties. In 2006, the health NGOs and STIVORO de-
veloped a policy agenda that included ending the
Tobacco Act’s hospitality exemption, raising to-
bacco taxes, requiring that health insurance plans
cover tobacco-use cessation, and increasing govern-
ment spending on tobacco control. They expanded
their smoke-free coalition to include Clean Air
Netherlands (CAN) and other groups. During the
November 2006 election campaign, the smoke-free
coalition lobbied to include their policy package
in the new government’s post-election agenda
(Gonzalez & Glantz, 2011: 4). At the same time, the
hospitality industry and its allies opposed the
smoke-free regulations, arguing they would lower
demand, reduce profits, and ultimately cost jobs
(e.g., Horeca Nederland, 2008; Synovate, 2008).
Throughout 2007, the hospitality industry as well
as smokers’ rights organizations continued to oppose
ending the industry’s exemption from the general
smoking ban by courting media attention (Gonzalez
& Glantz, 2011: 5). A recent study showed that most
newspaper coverage at the timewas negative toward
the smoking ban (57%), and had a small but signifi-
cantly negative effect on support for smoke-free bars
and restaurants (Nagelhout et al., 2011). Hospitality
organizations, individual venue owners, and the
Dutch employers’ association complained to parlia-
ment and the media that the then Minister of Health
(Ab Klink) was not working with them and that he
had failed to consider the SSB’s proposal that the
laws be phased in gradually between 2008 and 2011.
Minister Klink also investigated the possibility
of incorporating ventilation (i.e., separate smoking
rooms) as an alternative to implementing smoke-free
laws, but eventually rejected this option (Gonzalez &
Glantz, 2011: 5). The government decided to imple-
ment smoke-free legislation for the hospitality in-
dustry from July 1, 2008 (Nagelhout et al., 2011),
thereby rejecting the SSB’s phase-in proposal, with
the result that all hospitality venueswould be subject
to the same regulation.
Decreasing Compliance
The Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety
Authority (Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit; VWA) was
put in charge of enforcing the law and taking mea-
sures against bars that violated the smoking ban. Bars
could receive fines of up to 2,400 Euros, a significant
amount for businesses of this size. In addition, bars
that violated regulations repeatedly would face
criminal prosecution, and eventually be shut down.
In a study of 6,742 hospitality venues, it was found
that 5% of all organizations received official warn-
ings due to non-compliance; 750 of these venues
were bars, of which 37% received an official warn-
ing (VWA, 2008). The VWA also published a report
on the degree of subsequent compliance for the
2008–2010 period (VWA, 2010), during which time,
initially, most hospitality venues that were inspec-
ted seemed to comply. Yet, some differences among
various types of venues could already be seen to be
emerging. Of the bars and discotheques that were
inspected (;100 in total), 76% complied with the
new legislation, whereas compliance among other
hospitality venues, such as restaurants, hotels and
sports facilities, ranged from 94% to 100%. The non-
compliant organizations contended that they were
experiencing economic losses, and continued to vi-
olate the regulations (Gonzalez & Glantz, 2011). In
a letter to parliament, Minister Klink reported that,
fromOctober 1 toDecember 1, 2008, theVWAvisited
2,800 bars, 1,200 violations of the lawwere reported,
and 821 organizations were fined. By early 2010,
only 59% of all bars were complying with the
smoking ban.
According to the SSB, the associated economic
losses barswere experiencing following the smoking
ban were the main reason for not complying with it.
The Minister of Health commissioned the govern-
mental statistical agency (Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek; CBS) and TNS NIPO (a market research
firm in the Netherlands) to analyze prices, sales
volume, sales trends, and revenue growth, as well as
consumer confidence to evaluate the SSB’s claims
(Gonzalez &Glantz, 2011: 9). The CBS found that the
declining sales in bars were due to a myriad of fac-
tors: prices, weather conditions, the economy, and
consumer confidence. The main conclusion of the
agency’s study was that there was no direct connec-
tion with the smoking ban. The study conducted by
TNS NIPO arrived at similar conclusions. However,
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small bar owners and their allies persisted in their
claims of economic losses, and parliamentary
members continued to petition Minister Klink to
review alternatives to smoke-free regulations and to
respond to questions regarding the relation between
the decrease in proceeds and the introduction of the
smoking ban (which some members of parliament
portrayed as irresponsible behavior by the Minister)
throughout 2009. The Minister promised to con-
tinue monitoring economic developments in the
hospitality industry. However, questions were also
posed concerning the social function of bars in lo-
cal communities, with Member of Parliament and
former Minister of Immigration and Integration Rita
Verdonk specifically asking Minister Klink:
What do you think of the fact that this will be the end
of a large number of small neighborhood bars? Do you
think this has a harmful effect on the social cohesion
within communities?
—(Aanhangsel HAN TK, 2008–2009, nr. 1867)
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Institutional theory has moved away from earlier
concerns with isomorphism and conformity in the
faceof institutionalpressures towardanunderstanding
of social systemsas fragmentedandcontestedarenas in
which conflicting principles and values enacted in
discourse and action are more likely than coherent
sets ofdesiredprinciples andvalues (Dyck&Schroeder,
2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury,
2007; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). Efforts toward un-
derstanding the contested and indeterminate nature of
institutionalprocessesbuildonearlierwork toaddress
criticism against institutional theory for focusing on
the effects of the institutional environment on struc-
tural conformity while overlooking the role of interest
and agency in organizational adaptation to in-
stitutional environments (Greenwood&Hinings, 1996;
Oliver, 1991). Responding to institutional pressures
may confront actors with unfamiliar tasks, intensify
institutional contradictions, and entail the need to re-
draw the connections between sets of practices and the
moral and cultural foundations for those practices
(Slack & Hinings, 1994; Thomas & Davies, 2005).
Oliver (1991) was among the first to develop
a framework for institutional resistance, or, as re-
cently defined by Lawrence (2008: 171), “attempts of
actors to impose limits on institutional control and
institutional agency.” Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and
Hunt (1998) noted the potential for institutional re-
sistance by examining the differential strategic
responses of two Texas-based banks to new regula-
tion. Both banks resisted the institutional pressure
associated with the new regulation, but did so in
different ways because of a lack of congruence be-
tween the regulation and the banks’ strategic orien-
tations, identities, and images. While resistance is
often portrayed as a key but little-understood stra-
tegic response to institutional pressures, more re-
search is needed on the processes and mechanisms
throughwhich some actors derive the power to resist
and contest institutional pressures while others ac-
quiesce to them (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Marti
andFernandez (2013) studied the extremecase of the
Holocaust to try and analyze underlying mecha-
nisms stimulating resistance, and found that, while
resistance rarely occurs and, when it does, it is often
not very successful, sometimes, mundane efforts of
resistance can lead oppressed populations to con-
front systems of oppression.Outside of such extreme
contexts, though, it would be fruitful to further ex-
amine under what conditions organizations resist
institutional pressures.
Other studies in institutional theory have high-
lighted geographical differences that drive organi-
zational activities (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). Accordingly, we contend that
organizations’ resistance should be studied while
taking into account these geographical differences,
and that it is specifically organizations’ embedded-
ness in communities, which varies with respect to
a fundamental community attribute, social cohesion,
that will differentially affect their resistance. Mind-
ful that organizations, and their focal community, are
embedded in a broader social context, we also theo-
rize a contiguity effect of neighboring communities
on the aforementioned level of resistance.
The Role of Communities
Studies in the ecological tradition (Freeman &
Audia, 2006) and in the economic geography litera-
ture (Torre & Gilly, 2000) have long argued that
geographical proximity brings organizations to-
gether, furthers interaction with considerable in-
formation richness, and facilitates the exchange of
knowledge (especially tacit knowledge) between
actors, all of which ultimately results in a shared
interpretation and common understanding of vari-
ous stimuli. Geographic regions exhibit overarching
qualities that make them durably distinct (Molotch,
Freudenburg, & Paulsen, 2000). In institutional the-
ory, communities have attracted renewed attention,
not simply because of the significance of geographical
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boundaries but also because of the conceptualization
of communities as institutional orders (Greenwood
et al., 2010; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis,
Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011). As Greenwood
et al. (2010: 535) noted:
Analytical abstraction, intended to better capture
contextual influences, has resulted in a relative
blindness to how communities (regions) and their in-
teraction with state logics affect organizations. The
relationship between communities and organizations,
informed through an ideology of the state, was integral
to early institutional work, but that focus has largely
disappeared.A return to the traditional emphasis upon
community would be timely.
Consequently, geographic communities in which
organizations are embedded are considered to be an
important source of institutional pressures (Marquis
& Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2007). Marquis and
Battilana (2009) claimed that communities have an
enduring influence on the behavior of organiza-
tions, arguing that, in addition to variations in
laws, local market characteristics, and institu-
tional mechanisms could also explain differences in
organizational behavior across communities. For
example, Molotch et al. (2000) examined the differ-
ing ways in which two Californian urban areas,
Ventura County and Santa Barbara County, dealt
with external development projects (specifically, the
alternative approaches local actors took in dealing
with phenomena over which they had only partial
control but that would have significant effects on
both sites: anoil development anda freewayproject).
The authors found that the distinct character and
tradition of each community determined its re-
sponse to outside pressures. Similarly,Marquis et al.
(2007) posited that institutional forces within a spe-
cific community would have an effect on the nature
and level of corporate social practices; that is, local
understandings, norms, and rules may serve to le-
gitimize corporate social action. Davis and Greve
(1997) illustrated this effect in their study on the
adoption of “golden parachutes,” which were more
quickly adopted by locally headquartered compa-
nies in some cities than in others, depending on
relative standards of appropriateness. Guthrie’s
(2003) and Useem’s (1988) studies also illustrated
the existence of community-based norms and atti-
tudes, while Waldorff and Greenwood (2011) found
that communities have distinct sociocultural histo-
ries that generate important differences. In their
study on Danish municipalities, the latter authors
found that health care provision in local health care
centers “varied across municipalities despite a na-
tional commitment to universal access to the same
level and quality of service” (Waldorff &Greenwood,
2011: 136). Greenwood et al. (2010) demonstrated
that there are strong community effects on organi-
zational decisions related to the generation of profits,
and Almandoz (2012) showed the impact of com-
munity logics on the success of establishing new
banking ventures. Collectively, these studies suggest
a powerful effect of geographical communities on
organizational behavior.
However, there have been only a few attempts to
understand the impact of communities in explain-
ing resistance to institutional pressures. Lounsbury
(2007) showed that competing logics among differ-
ent communities shaped variation in the behavior of
distinct groups of actors (mutual funds in Boston
resisted the aggressive strategies ofNewYork funds).
Marquis and Lounsbury (2007), too, found that var-
iation in resistant behavior could be related to geo-
graphical differences. Their study focused on
community-level actors that operated with local
community logic “to protect local autonomy in the
face of outsiders’ impositions of national logics over
multiple geographic regions” (Marquis&Lounsbury,
2007: 800). Thus, it seems that community-level
attributes, and in particular those relating to the so-
cial fabric of the community, may spur organiza-
tions to resist certain pressures. By incorporating
community-level attributes into the study of re-
sistance, we move away from the more instrumental
nature of strategic responses and follow the sugges-
tions of Oliver (1991) and Marquis and Lounsbury
(2007) to understand resistance as being socially
structured.
We consider two major factors in predicting re-
sistance to regulatory pressures: (1) social cohesion
and (2) the prevalence of resistance in neighboring
communities. First, we ask whether a community’s
degree of social cohesion has an impact on organi-
zations residing andoperating in it. The ideaof social
cohesion and its consequences is central to sociology
(e.g., Durkheim, 1897/1951; To¨nnies, 1887/1957),
including a specific focus on community cohesion
(e.g., Brint, 2001; Sampson, 1991; Sampson,
McAdam, MacIndoe, & Weffer-Elizondo, 2005).
In an illuminating review of the concept of social co-
hesion, Friedkin (2004) highlighted its multiple
definitions, or “definitional confusion,” suggesting
that this is a result of the complexity of the re-
ciprocally linked individual- and group-level nature
of the phenomenon (see also Chan et al., 2006).
Addressing the vast literature of social cohesion is
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not our goal here, though; rather, we propose to build
on some of the earlier work of social cohesion in
general (Festinger, 1950; Friedkin, 2004) and com-
munity cohesion in particular (Almandoz, 2012;
Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Portes & Sensenbrenner,
1993; Uzzi, 1996) to reason that a community’s de-
gree of cohesiveness will have an effect on the focal
community’s organizations’ resistance to externally
instigated institutional pressures.
Social cohesion is often presented as a multi-
dimensional concept (Chan, To, & Chan, 2006;
Friedkin, 2004; Kearns & Forrest, 2000), and in this
study we focus on two key dimensions, residential
stability and kinship, as “the building-blocks of so-
cial cohesion reside within places” (Kearns &
Forrest, 2000: 1001). Furthermore, these two di-
mensions map respectively onto an analytical dis-
tinction common in cohesion research between the
relational and ideational components, which, how-
ever, “does not imply causal precedence of one di-
mensionover theother” (Moody&White, 2003: 104).
As we explain in detail below, each dimension
operates via a differentmechanism in contributing to
the eventual organizations’ action in the face of in-
stitutional pressure: residential stability fosters
a latent relational infrastructure, while kinship
generates a sense of belonging and care about the
community.
We also consider how resistance in a given com-
munity is dependent on a contiguity effect—that is,
the influence of neighboring communities. Com-
munities are part of a larger social context of adjacent
communities that affect a focal community through
the movement of symbolic and physical resources
across communities’ boundaries (Lamont & Molnar,
2002). Extending a classical argument in institu-
tional theory, the likelihood of resistance increase
when communities geographically proximate to a fo-
cal community show a high level of resistance, due to
mimetic processes triggered by environmental pres-
sures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). We postulate that,
furthered by mobilization and collective action by
similar organizations in neighboring communities,
similar organizations actively assist one another in
the face of common threat.
Community Cohesion: Residential Stability
Identification with a collectivity and connections
among members of the collectivity refer respec-
tively to the ideational and relational dimensions
of cohesion, which might mutually reinforce each
other (Moody & White, 2003). Simply put, the
“relational dimension” refers to the connections or
relationships among the collectivity’s members,
which, we posit, are to a large extent a consequence
of residential stability. In developing this argument,
we reiterate the prominent focus on membership
continuity and turnover that was a feature of early
works on social cohesion (e.g., Festinger, Schachter,
& Back, 1950) and remains salient in later research
(e.g., McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 2002), maintaining
that residential stability has “direct positive effects
on local social ties,which in turn increase the level of
community social cohesion” (Sampson, 1991: 47).
Moreover, as explained below, community social
cohesion promotes a community’s ability to “solve
common problems.”
In communities where the turnover of residents is
relatively low, there is a greater likelihood that the
relational facet of cohesion will develop through the
interplay of building connections over time among
the community’s residents (Kearns & Forrest, 2000).
As shown, for example, in Kasarda and Janowitz’s
(1974) study, residential stability has positive and
highly significant direct effects on almost all types of
local social bonds, and particularly noteworthy is its
strong effect on the number of acquaintances in the
community. In other words, residential stability fa-
cilitates many contact points and provides opportu-
nities for people to live side by side, get in touchwith
each other, and spend time in the same places
(Chaskin, 1997), resulting in a latent relational in-
frastructure. Borne out of the daily functioning of
residents within their community, these connec-
tions are “latent” in that they are not necessarily
acted on, manifested, or exploited on a regular basis
(see a similar point made by Starkey, Barnatt, &
Tempest, 2000: 300, with respect to organizations).
Thus, individuals residing together in a community
over time enables the formation of many “unused
ties” (Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012). Such a state of
affairs can remain in place for an indeterminate pe-
riod, but, when faced with a common enemy or ex-
ternal interference, adverse pressure, or threat, this
basic latent relational infrastructure will allow fast
mobilization of the community. This proclivity has
been referred to as “collective efficacy,” which “is
meant to signify an emphasis on conjoint capability
for action to achieve an intended effect, andhence an
active sense of collective engagement on the part
of residents to solve problems” (Sampson et al.,
2005: 676).
In view of this, we posit that the then newly in-
troduced anti-smoking ban posed an external threat,
challenge, or “common problem” to be resolved (cf.
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Sampson, 1991) to a community as important local
organizations (Lashley, 2000) serving social, cul-
tural, aswell as economic functionswere threatened.
In such situations, local communities and their or-
ganizations react defensively, aiming for a strict
“conservation of their space” (Castells, 1997: 62).
And, while all small bars in the Netherlands faced
the same regulations and occupied significant social
roles in their respective communities, the residential
stability levels of the affected communities varied. It
is therefore expected that, in communities exhibiting
greater residential stability, the resulting latent re-
lational infrastructure will be more developed and
readily available for mobilization in the face of
the common threat, and these at-risk organizations’
owners and residents will be more likely to join
forces in actions aimed at preserving and defending
the preferred cultural and economic status-quo
against the new regulations or other similarly ad-
verse institutional pressures. Accordingly:
Hypothesis 1. Communitieswith ahighdegreeof
residential stability will have more bars resisting
the smoking ban, compared to communities with
a low degree of residential stability.
Community Cohesion: Kinship
While the section above focused on the relational
dimension of social cohesion emanating from resi-
dential stability, here we focus on a sense of identi-
ficationwith andbelonging to—a collectivity thatwe
refer to in this study as “kinship.” Kinship is the
sentiment, sense, or feeling that bonds residents to
a specific place—community—and generates com-
mitment and a responsibility for the residents to take
care of it. A community’s social cohesion in this
sense results from the positive effect that a strong
sense of belonging, or attachment to a place and
residents’ identities intertwining with that of the
place, has on notions such as adherence to common
values and norms, the salience of past experiences,
and common ideas and culture (Kearns & Forrest,
2000). The presence of a sense of belonging to the
community is valuable in supporting residents’ ac-
knowledgment of their collective circumstances,
and, thus, their motivation for collective action
(Chaskin, 1997). A common understanding among
residents concerning their preferences for various
aspects of the community’s guiding vision, everyday
functioning, and long-term viability will thereby be
established. Furthermore, a sense of belonging to a
community and kinship are claimed to be conducive
to the development and cementing of mutual obli-
gation among not only individuals but also the or-
ganizations and businesses sited in the community.
Such a community, it is argued,will bemore likely to
stick together in the face of threats to its values and
norms (Lamont & Molnar, 2002) even when this
would conflict with “any sense of common national
purpose” (Forrest & Kearns, 2001: 2128).
The campaign against the smoking banwas framed
in economic and social language focusing on the
economic hardships, but also (significantly, for the
purposes of our study) on the smoking ban as under-
mining bars’ “community function.” Ton Wurtz, co-
founder of the SSB, declared: “A small bar inHolland
has a social function and what you are doing is that
you rip that out of the society through this stupid law”
(Stichting Horecaclaim Nederland, 2009). Bars are
considered to play “an important role in defining the
identities of groups, communities, and societies, and
in defining the relationship between individuals and
the wider social context” (Lashley, 2000: 8–9).
Through the “consumption of food anddrink, and the
rituals and norms associated with that, individuals
express their connectedness or disconnectedness
with the wider community” (Lashley, 2000: 9). Spe-
cifically, in the Netherlands, “gezelligheid” (liter-
ally, sociability and conviviality) is a core value that
is “exercised” in local bars and supersedes an array of
other values, reinforcing the bars’ central social
function in local communities, as expressed in the
SSB representative’s assertion above. We anticipate
that it is the varying strength of kinship that exists
among communities, though, that will, owing to rel-
ative levels of mutual obligation and caring, differ-
entially influence the extent to which bars will resist
the anti-smoking bans. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. Communities with a higher level
of kinship will have more bars resisting the
smoking ban, compared to communities with
a low level of kinship.
Community Contiguity: Resistance in Neighboring
Communities
A focal community is not an isolate. Every com-
munity is embedded in an environment consisting of
other, adjacent communities, and we consider that
this broader social context affects the focal commu-
nity through themovement of symbolic andphysical
resources across communities’ boundaries (Lamont
& Molnar, 2002). That is, through these resource
flows across communities’ boundaries, adjacent
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communities influence various aspects of one another.
Sociologists who have studied disadvantaged commu-
nities, focusing on outcomes such as violence rates or
child maltreatment, have found a strong effect of con-
tagion across proximate communities, effects that
hold independent of amyriad of the focal community’s
characteristics (Coulton, Korbin, Su, & Chow, 1995;
Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001).
In this study, we build on the above-noted notions
and findings, but postulate somewhat different dy-
namics, involving a contiguity effect between adja-
cent communities with respect to resistance levels,
andarguing, asweexplain below, that this contiguity
effect varies with the focal community’s level of so-
cial cohesion (in terms of both residential stability
and kinship) due to the latter’s effect on boundary
permeability. The contiguity effect is driven by the
ambiguity and uncertainty experienced by the orga-
nizations with respect to what the best course of ac-
tion is. Given thedisparity between the actors’power
and the issue at hand, the bars in our study faced
a real predicament: their survival was threatened
either way, as they risked losing customers if they
compliedwith the smoking banor severe sanctions if
they did not, including fines, prosecution, and clo-
sure in case of repeated offenses. Following similar
others who are facing the same circumstances and
are proximate can be thought of as a mimetic re-
sponse to such uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983: 151), and also as a “safety in numbers” strategy
(Hedstro¨m, 1994: 1163).
For small bars located in Dutch communities, mi-
metic behavior was a plausible response to the un-
certain situation they found themselves inwhen facing
the new smoking ban regulations. Here, the behavior
being imitated was (active) resistance to the smoking
bans.1 Conceptually, the greater the number of orga-
nizations in nearby communities that display a certain
type of behavior, themore likely it is that organizations
in the focal community will behave similarly. Leicht
and Jenkins (1998) argued, for example, that geo-
graphic mimetic pressures from adjacent states had
a positive effect on the adoption of public venture
capital programs. Furthermore, especially in the case
of contentious practices (such as resisting a smoking
ban), it is likely that significant consistency of organi-
zations’ behavior within proximate communities will
be visible, salient, and influential (Davis & Greve,
1997). Relatedly, but highlighting a different aspect of
following others, mimetic responses may provide
valuable signals and information about the actual
implications of choosing a certain course of action
(Hedstro¨m, 1994), or that the risks associated with an
action that involves significant costs may bemitigated
as the number of actors choosing it increases.
In addition to and reinforcing the mimetic dynam-
ics among organizations located in proximate com-
munities, we maintain that, when the organizations
involved are small and relatively powerless, active
cross-community boundary collective action and
mobilization are more likely to occur. Neighboring
communities are likely to be more “institutionally
proximate,”which means they share cultural norms
and habits to some degree allowing for coordinated
action between organizations in these communities
(Boschma, 2005). Hence, similar organizations fac-
ing comparable pressures, constraints, and threats
to their viability have an incentive to share in-
formation, warn against impending inspections, and
collaborate with others in neighboring communities
to successfully resist that significant threat. Naturally,
such actions are easier to perform with organizations
in proximate communities, as compared to organiza-
tions in distant communities (see Zukin & DiMaggio,
1990). Thus, in the context of our study, we posit:
Hypothesis 3. Communities that share borders
with communities that exhibit high levels of re-
sistance will have a higher number of bars
resisting the smoking ban, compared to com-
munities that share their borders with commu-
nities with low levels of resistance.
A key property of boundaries is that they are per-
meable, but this permeability is variable and con-
tingent (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). In our study, we
expect resistance levels in neighboring communities
to interact with both dimensions of community
cohesiveness—residential stability and kinship—as
more cohesive groups are also characterized bymore
impervious boundaries, and are thus less open or
receptive to information, ideas, and values coming
from others who are not a part of the group (Janis,
1982) or are located beyond the group’s boundaries
(Lamont & Molnar, 2002). Residential stability im-
plies less in-flow of ideas and influences from out-
side, and refers to the “physical permeability” of
a community boundary: ideas from the outside are-
not “physically carried in” by new entrants. Orga-
nizations in communities with a high degree of
residential stability may not look beyond the
1 Since surrounding communities might exhibit various
levels of either resistance or compliance, it can be argued
that compliance is also being imitated. However, for the
purpose of this study, we are interested primarily in
resistance.
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boundaries of their community due to lock-in (e.g.,
Boschma, 2005), and may be less open to opportu-
nities and resources outside of their own community
(Knoben & Oerlemans, 2012). Research concerning
the Swiss watch industry showed that such network
rigidities had a negative effect on the ability of the
sector to respond to external pressures, causing the
partial collapse of the Jura region’s competitive po-
sition (Glasmeier, 1991). Consequently, we expect
that the effect of resistance in neighboring commu-
nitieswill beweaker in communities that experience
a reduced in-flow of ideas and influences due to
lesser movement of residents across shared bound-
aries. Hence:
Hypothesis 4. The effect of the level of resistance
in neighboring communities is weaker in com-
munities exhibiting greater residential stability.
As a community’s level of kinship increases, its
normative framework becomes more salient and
entrenched, such that it is less amenable to ideas or
other influences coming from beyond its bound-
aries, regardless of the nature of these ideas. Com-
munities with high levels of kinship, and, by
extension, the organizations located in them, will
be less prone to learn from others or collaborate
(again, independent of what those positions, ac-
tions, or sentiments are). Moreover, high degrees of
kinship tend to create more trust between insiders
and less trust in outsiders. Such insider–outsider
distinctions may “foster parochial narrowminded-
ness” and are considered a potential downside of
communities (Bowles & Gintis, 2002: F428). In
a study on territorial agglomerations of firms, the
effect of trust on innovation was found to be nega-
tive when the degree of localized trust led firms to
collaborate with organizations they were already
familiar with rather than with firms they did not
know (Molina-Morales & Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez,
2009). In our study, referring to the “cognitive
permeability” of a community boundary,we expect
that a strong sense of belonging to a particular com-
munity and the accompanying normative framework
will limit the utilization of ideas, norms, and values
from beyond the focal community’s boundary. That
is, whatever the community’s position is on a cer-
tain issue, the more cohesive it is, the less likely it
will be influenced by external sentiments or be-
haviors. Thus:
Hypothesis 5. The effect of the level of resistance
in neighboring communities is weaker in com-
munities exhibiting higher levels of kinship.
RESEARCH METHODS
Qualitative Findings
We collected qualitative data to obtain a better
understanding of the small bar owners’ motivations
for resisting the smoking ban. Since they were fac-
ing a large powerful actor that was actively enforcing
the new law, we wanted to know the reasons for re-
sistance and gain a better overview of their actions
and the underlying mechanisms that triggered these
actions. In addition, we wanted to understand the
positions of various stakeholders (such as bar pa-
trons (smokers and nonsmokers), trade associations,
politicians, and anti-smoking lobby groups) con-
cerning the smoking ban. Two main data sources
were used: newspaper articles and telephone
interviews.
For the newspaper articles, we relied on the Lexis/
Nexis database. The law came into force on July 1,
2008, but the heated public debate surrounding the
ban had started months earlier, and therefore our
search covers the whole of 2008. We used “smoking
ban” as our search string in all Dutch newspapers
(national and regional), which generated more than
3,000 results. After Lexis/Nexis automatically de-
leted articles with strong similarities, we were left
with 958 newspaper articles. A further round of de-
leting articles with moderate similarities resulted in
706 newspaper articles. We then started reading
these articles and further reduced the number to 563,
deleting articles that referred to smoking bans in
other countries. This final set of articles was down-
loaded and relevant quotes were saved into a sepa-
rate file.
Nineteen interviews were conducted with small
bar owners in order to better understand the context
of small bars and to identify reasons and motives
for their resistance (to the ban) and its nature. These
interviews were conducted by phone in 2012 and
were subsequently transcribed. Although the smok-
ing ban had been effected in 2008, the bar owners
could vividly remember what they did after the law
was implemented. Small bars were still resisting the
ban in 2012, and there were several lawsuits from
small bars filed against the state challenging the
various requirements the regulations imposed on
them, which implied the issue was still unresolved.
Table 1 presents an overview of the demographics of
the bar owners we interviewed and their reasons for
resistance/compliance and subsequent actions.
The quotes from the newspaper articles and
telephone interviews reflected opinions of the bar
owners and a variety of stakeholders, and were
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TABLE 1
Demographics of Bars
Bar
Owner
experience
(in years)
Avg. no. of
customers
(per week)
Size
(m2) Main reasons for resistance/compliance Actions
1 38 150 60 90% of the customers smoke and other small bars
in adjacent communities also resist the ban
Collects signatures for SSB; puts
ashtrays on tables if customers
ask for them
2 12 70 68 Perhaps 10 customers do not smoke, but they have
no objection to other people smoking
Ask smokers to donate 1 euro for
paying fines
3 5 100–200 50 Smoking is part of the bar No, just a member
4 21 100–300 45 Majority of customers smoke; if they were to have
to go outside, conversations would be
interrupted or non-smokers would also go
outside
“We allowed smoking and we
always kept ashtrays on the
table”
5 10 60–70 125 Decrease in number of customers and support from
local community
Protested in the Hague; left trade
association because it did not
do enough for small bars
6 5 100 68 80% of customers smoke, and, 300 m from his bar,
they allow people to smoke
Left ashtrays on the tables
7 10 60–80 69 A bar should be an extension of your own living
room; 80% [of the customers] smoke and the
gezelligheid would be gone if people have to go
outside
Left ashtrays on the tables; called
colleagues to warn of
inspectors
8 1 200 70 Personallynot in favorof the smokingban, butdoes
not allow smoking and complies with the law
n/a
9 12 500 35 Persuaded by other bars to resist; after two fines,
started to comply
Left ashtrays on the bar
10 17 2,000 300 Against interference from the government Left ashtrays on the tables; SMSs
colleagues to warn of
inspectors
11 7 40 42 Clients left after initial compliance, so allows
smoking again
12 7 100 68 75–80% of customers smoke; fear of losing
customers to competitors; but, after the last fine,
smoking is no longer allowed
Left ashtrays on the tables; called
colleagues to warn of
inspectors; customers paid for
the first fine
13 18 300–400 40 Complied for two months, but did not consider it
a bar anymore; personnel wanted to quit; even
non-smokers did not like the smoking ban
14 unknown 500 100–150 Allows smoking because customers will leave and
go elsewhere; nobody objects to people smoking
in the bar
Provides ashtrays if people ask for
them; warns the neighbor of
inspection
15 1 110–120 70 Initially complied, but atmosphere in bar changed;
strong support from customers to allow smoking
again, as well as from bar owners in adjacent
communities
Customers contributed to paying
fine; participated in several
demonstrations; puts ashtrays
on tables
16 26 Unknown 75–80 Complied, but customers now go elsewhere and
the atmosphere in bar has gone
17 42 Unknown 40 Majority of customers smoke; population in
general also against the smoking ban
Puts ashtrays on the tables
18 6 200 60 People shouldbe allowed tomake their ownchoice
and support the resistance
19 7 500–1,000 , 100 90% of customers smoke; supports the resistance;
fear of losing customers
Customers may donate to the
“smoke pot”; calls in case of
inspections; beer cans used as
“ashtrays in disguise”
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sorted into the keymechanismswe identified: latent
social ties, kinship, willingness to act, and collabo-
ration across communities (see Table 2). Latent so-
cial ties referred to the bars having an important
social function in the community as a place where
people meet, talk, and socialize.2 Small bars were
supported by their customers, both smokers and
non-smokers, to resist the law, and they also vol-
untarily donated money to pay for non-compliance
fines.Wenoticed that small bars and their customers
considered themselves to be part of a “family.”Non-
smokers also frequently complained about their
friends having to smoke outside, as it spoiled the
atmosphere in the bar (as expressed in Table 2). In-
voking the notion of a family and identificationwith
smokers by their non-smoking friends highlighted
the kinship felt among owners and patrons, smokers
andnon-smokers alike. Therewas also evidence that
bar owners looked outside the boundaries of their
community to collaborate with bar owners in neigh-
boring communities. This was observed through
reference to specific actions undertaken when in-
spectors showed up (calling or texting their col-
leagues towarn them)ordiscussionsconcerningwhat
to do with the smoking ban and a collective decision
to resist. Latent ties, kinship, and collaboration with
other bar owners triggered a strong willingness to act
on behalf of the small bar owners. This willingness to
act was also visible from the point of view of bar
ownerswhodidcomplywith the law,whomentioned
that their colleagues who resisted were sometimes
threatening toward them (see Table 2).
In addition, we looked for quotes that referred to
specific actions taken by bar owners, to better un-
derstand the nature of their resistance. There were
three general types of actions: (1) symbolic actions,
(2) monetary actions, and (3) actions against in-
spections (see Table 3). Symbolic actions often
sidestepped the law by changing the nature of the
establishment. For instance, some bars claimed to be
a member of the Universal Church of Smokers from
God. They changed their statutes and thereby mem-
bers were officially practicing religion in their
church (i.e., the bar) byworshiping the holy trinity of
smoke, ash, and fire (see also Table 3). Alternatively,
since the lawwas partly aimed at providing a smoke-
freeworkplace, a bar could claim tobe a “self-service”
bar, which then implied there was no personnel
needed and so smoking could be allowed (bars with-
out employees were, at that point, exempted). Others
created a smokers’ association that hadmemberswho
were only in the bar for formal meetings. The agenda
of these meetings included topics such as the color of
pencils and the shape of beer mats, and, when they
were held, all members had to attend, which again
implied that there was no personnel needed. In ad-
dition to such circumventions, bar owners’monetary
actions involved asking for donations or giving cus-
tomers the opportunity to voluntarily donate money
to pay any non-compliance fines incurred, while ac-
tions against inspectors mainly comprised alerting
colleagues by calling or texting them. Moreover,
some bar owners published pictures of inspectors
on the Internet so that they could be easily recog-
nized by other bar owners, and, since most small
bars have a regular group of bar patrons, “outsiders”
might now also be identified as inspectors (see
Table 3).
Quantitative Hypothesis Testing
In order to test our hypotheses, we gathered and
combined quantitative data from several sources.
Below, we describe these data sources and the
computations used to construct the measures for
each of our variables. Before doing so, however, we
should first address the operationalization of our
level of analysis: the community. Given that we de-
fined communities as the populations, organiza-
tions, and markets located in a geographic territory
and sharing, as a result of their common location,
elements of local culture, norms, identity, and laws
(Marquis & Battilana, 2009), municipalities were the
logical geographical entities to use in the Dutch
context.3 Dutch municipalities are relatively small
geographical units that coincide with cities or towns
and their surrounding environment. They have their
own local elections and autonomous governments,
and many laws that are relevant to pubs and bars,
2 We acknowledge that these examples pertain to man-
ifestations of the latent social infrastructure in reaction to
the strong institutional pressure on the communities. By
definition, the underlying latent social infrastructure is
very difficult to empirically observe.
3 The number of such municipalities fluctuates slightly
over the years, due to administrative mergers. Given that
not all of our data sources pertain to the same year, these
fluctuations need to be resolved. Therefore, we used the
municipal classification of 2010 for each of our measures.
In this year, the Netherlands comprised 431 municipali-
ties. After dropping the 4 largest urban municipalities
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht) for rea-
sons that are explained below,wehave 427observations in
our statistical analyses.
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such as those regarding opening hours and patio
permits, are determined at the municipality level.
Moreover, municipalities exhibit high levels of
economic homogeneity and social cohesion (Tolsma,
van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009), and are relatively
homogenous in terms of the norms and beliefs of
their population (van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis, &
Ultee, 2005). As such, they serve as an excellent
operationalization of the concept of communities
as we have defined them, and have been used as
such in prior policy (Plantinga, de Ridder, & Corra,
2011), economics (Knoben, Ponds, & van Oort,
2011), and sociology studies (van Tubergen et al.,
2005).
However, the above arguments in support of their
use in our research context are less applicable to the
municipalities that contain the country’s biggest
cities. In these cities, the bars and pubs, especially
those in the city center, don’t serve the local com-
munity but instead cater primarily to tourists.
Moreover, different rules and regulations often ap-
ply to pubs and bars in different parts of those cities
(e.g., there are specific rules and regulations for
pubs in the red light district inAmsterdam). Finally,
these big cities are economically and socially much
more heterogeneous than smaller communities.
Based on these considerations, we opted to ex-
clude the four municipalities (out of a total of 431
TABLE 2
Mechanisms Driving Bars’ Resistance
Mechanism Stakeholders Representative quotes
Latent social ties Politics “Their problem is also our problem. Small neighborhood bars have a social
function and it is a bad thing if the owners have to shut down due to the
smoking ban. We cannot change the law, but we can discuss the financial
problems with the government.”
Customers “Yeah, when it just started, I must admit, I think that our regular customers,
andalso those thatwerenot regular, they supportedus.Wehada ‘smokepot’
and itwas completely voluntary,wehad no rule that they had to donate. But
many people were happy that we resisted. They were very willing to
donate.”
Kinship/sense of belonging Customers “I come here for the gezelligheid. If all smokers go outside, I will be here all by
myself. I have asked the bar owner if my friends could please smoke again.”
Publisher ofRookvrij
[Smoke Free]
“The social aspect goes a longway, so I have noticed. The owner is family and
the bar patrons are your best friends. There are pets, they save money for
a joint social event and the glasswith your name on it is stored and locked at
nightwhen the bar closes.As an outsider, youdonot enter easily. Youmight
actually wonder how pubic these bars actually are.”
Collaboration between bar
owners across communities
Anti-smoking lobby “There are evenpacts betweenbar owners to jointly resist the smokingban.We
think the governmentdoesnot realize it, but it spreads like anoil stain.A few
more months and you can smoke even in restaurants again.”
Bar owners “No, they figured that out quickly. So, they, for instance, would not first check
the entire village, but would inspect a bar here and then, in the next village,
another bar. So, they found out quickly. But we continued calling our
colleagues [to warn] that they just visited us.” (Bar owner, telephone
interview)
“We are here in a circle of three villages with three bars. And all three had the
same ideas regarding the smoking ban.” (Bar owner, telephone interview)
Willingness to act Bar owners “I ammore or less being intimidated by my colleagues because I refuse to put
the ashtrays back on the table.” (Bar owner)
“If every bar owner would put in 50 Euros, we could hire a lawyer with that
money, like they do in Tilburg [city in the south of the Netherlands]. The
fines that we get, we can fight these, and, for now, not pay them.”
Customers Agents of the inspection agency VWA are being threatened when checking
implementation of the smoking ban. “The aggression does not come from
the bar owners, but from the customers. Especially in the evenings when
they visit the bars. It is mainly verbal aggression and threats, but it is
annoying since these people are only doing their job.” (Inspection agency)
Trade association “We have to be careful that the industry is not being splintered because more
and more bars are ignoring the smoking ban. It would be very bad if the
smoking ban were to lead to disputes.”
2016 557Simons, Vermeulen, and Knoben
municipalities) that contain the four largest cities of
the Netherlands.
Data Sources and Measures
Dependent variable.Tomeasure the resistance to
the smokingban,weused themembership files of the
SSB foundation at the end of 2008. These member-
ship files contained the names and addresses of pubs
and bars that openly stated that they were against
the smoking ban, and, in almost all cases, allowed
smoking on their premises, even though doing so
represented violating the law at the time. Based on
the address information of these pubs, we could de-
termine inwhichmunicipality thebarswere located.
This information was used to calculate our de-
pendent variable, the number of bars in the munici-
pality appearing on the member list of the SSB.
To validate our measure of resistance to the
smoking ban, we used data on the number of fines
that were given to bar owners for violating the
smoking ban. These data were not made public by
the inspection agency (VWA) for a long time. In
June 2014, however, a newspaperwon a government
transparency lawsuit that forced the VWA to dis-
close most of this information. They did not disclose
TABLE 3
Bar Owners’ Responses
Response Motivation/actions Representative quotes
Resistance Economic reasons “I was able to comply for amonth or three.My turnoverwent down by 25%. If my
customers ask me, they are allowed to smoke. You have to do something,
otherwise they will stay away.”
Atmosphere in the bar “I personally think that a smoking ban for a restaurant is good, that it will benefit
the flavor of the food. But the atmosphere has really changed. You are having
a nice conversation, but, when someone wants to smoke, he or she has to go
outside. Sometimes you will be alone just waiting for your partner.”
“I amnot a smokermyself, but I really don’t like it [the smokingban]. Sometimes it
is just me at the bar, because everybody has to go outside to light a cigarette.”
Principal issue “If it is not permitted to smoke in my joint, I quit. If you kill someone in the
Netherlands, you get less punishment than a bar owner leaving ashtrays in his
bar. I risk18,000Eurosof fines.Why?Toprotect people fromsmoke.But I refuse
to comply. I prefer to close the doors.”
Compliance Mimetic behavior “It does not really affect me. It would be different if the bars in my direct
environment would have ashtrays back on the table. Then your customers are
gone. It is as simple as that. But we have an agreement: no ashtrays.”
Fear of fines “Yes, I amoneof the fewbars in [themunicipality]where theashtray isnot backon
the table. Some of my customers are laughing at me. They say that I am an idiot
because other bars do allow smoking. But, within a day or ten, I expect the first
serious fines. The pressure from politics to enforce the lawwill be high. So that
will happen.”
Community solidarity “I am optimistic about the future of the village bar. Many regular patrons have
said: ‘I will be coming.’This village is very solidary; peoplewill notmiss out on
their beer. And, another advantage: I do not have to clean dirty ashtrays again.”
Resistance tactics Symbolic actions “We got a lot of nice reactions to the tipi. On Friday, a lot of police officerswere in
it, and people who went to church were also enthusiastic. But, it is obviously
ridiculous to have to ask your guests to smoke in a tipi. Wewould have liked to
smoke the peace pipe with the Minister though.”
“Smoking is a religious activity for us; so we joined the Universal Church of
Smokers from God. I also think people have the right to smoke. We will keep
resisting the smoking ban. I have been consecrated as a priest and can accept
new members. The government is now hindering us from practicing our
religion.”
“We ask smokers for a voluntary contribution for paying the fines.”
Monetary actions “We have a smoking pot, where regular customers donate money to pay for the
first fine of 300 Euros.”
“We agreed that we would call each other when the inspector is visiting us.”
Actions against inspections The action committee is about to publish pictures of inspectors on the Internet. “It
is not our intention to publicly disgrace these people, but we should knowwho
is coming into our bars.”
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thenames of the bars thatwere fined, but diddisclose
the municipalities in which the fined bar was lo-
cated.On the basis of this information,we calculated
the number of fines per municipality for the period
2008–2009. One problem associated with this mea-
surewas that the same barswere often finedmultiple
times, whereas other bars were never inspected and
therefore not fined at all. Nonetheless, we expected
a substantial correlation between the number of
members of the SSB foundation and the number of
fines given for violating the smoking ban. The cor-
relation between the two measures in our data was
0.83, which is indeed substantial. This provided us
with additional confidence that our measure based
on SSB membership truly reflected resistance to the
smoking ban.
To provide insights into the spatial distribution of
resistance to the smoking ban, we mapped SSB
membership as well as the number of fines per mu-
nicipality (see Figures 1 and 2). This analysis
revealedahighcorrelationbetweenbothmeasuresof
resistance, as the spatial patterns for both were very
similar. Specifically, they revealed that the level of
resistance was not uniformly distributed across
municipalities. Moreover, the pattern of resistance
did not simply reflect differences in urbanization.
Even though many of the bigger cities showed high
levels of resistance, a strong pocket of resistance
could also be identified in the southeast of the
Netherlands,which is a rather rural area. Overall, we
observed that there was substantial variation in re-
sistance to the smoking ban across communities.
Independent variables. As noted above, we
gathered and combined data from many different
sources to operationalize our independent and con-
trol variables. Whenever possible, we established
a time lag with our dependent variable. For variables
for which sufficient data were available, we even
constructed different time lags. However, as com-
munity characteristics are relatively stable over time,
using (different) time lags had no effect on our study’s
results whatsoever. A summary of the measurement
and sources of each of our variables, with links to the
organizations from which we obtained the data
(where applicable), is provided in Table 4.
The first dimension of community cohesiveness,
the level of residential stability, wasmeasured based
on (a) the number of people entering a community
through residential moves relative to the number of
inhabitants and (b) the number of people leaving
a community through residential moves relative
to the number of inhabitants. We separately calcu-
lated the share of new entrants and leavers in the
community in 2007, the year prior to the measure-
ment of ourdependent variable.We standardized the
resulting variables, and, finally, inverted the vari-
ables, so that high scores on the variables reflect high
levels of residential stability (Sampson, 1991: 47).
Given that these twovariableswerehighly correlated
(0.84), we averaged them to arrive at our final mea-
sure of residential stability.Note that only residential
moveswithin theNetherlands are taken into account
for the construction of this variable. The number of
international movers (both in and out) is relatively
small and almost perfectly correlated with our con-
trol variable that captures the level of population
density of the community.
The second dimension of community cohesiveness,
the level of kinship, was measured using in-
formation from the National Housing Survey from
2008. This survey is taken every four years, and
2008 therefore was the year closest to the measure-
ment of our dependent variable. In this survey,
a sample of 78,071 respondents designed to be
representative at the municipal level was asked
numerous questions regarding their living envi-
ronment. Several of these questions were specifi-
cally designed to measure social cohesion (VROM,
2009), and we adopted the measure developed by
Goudriaan, Wittebrood, and Nieuwbeerta (2006)
basedonnineof the items fromthissurvey(seeTable4).
Each item was answered on a seven-point Likert scale
and our measure of kinship was based on the average
answer over the nine items. The reliability of this scale
is very high (a 5 0.83 in our data). To arrive at our
community-level measure of kinship, we averaged the
scores of all individuals in a given municipality.
The measure we used to capture the contiguity
effect was calculated on the basis of our dependent
variable. Using spatial econometrics, we calculated
the spatially lagged variable of our dependent vari-
able based on an exponential distance decay func-
tion (Doh & Hahn, 2008). This variable captured
the level of resistance in the communities sur-
rounding the focal community with the weight of
these neighboring municipalities exponentially
diminishing with the distance from the focal mu-
nicipality. Mathematically, a spatial lag takes the
following form:
WYi5 +
n
j5 1
Yj
d2ij
where WYi is the spatial lag of variable Y for mu-
nicipality i, anddij is the geographical distance as the
crow flies between the centroids of municipality i
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and j. This spatial lag is inserted in a regression
equation together with a vector of other independent
or control variables (Xi), resulting in the following
basic regression equation:
Yi5b01b1Xi1b2WYi1 ei
The intuition behind a spatially lagged variable is
similar to that of a time lag in, for example, panel data
analysis. The only difference is that, in our case, the
influence on the dependent variable did not come
from the past but from the neighboring regions.
Control variables. Given that our dependent
variable was the absolute number of resistors to the
smoking ban, we needed to control for the size of the
spawning ground from which this resistance could
arise. As such, we included the number of bars and
pubs in themunicipality in 2008 as a control variable.
To compute this control variable, we utilized in-
formation from the branch organization for hotels,
restaurants, cafes, and catering.
We also controlled for the extent to which local
bars might feel that their resistance was legitimized
by the local government. The level of political op-
position to smoking ban was measured by the per-
centage of voters in the municipality that voted for
theonlypolitical party that opposed the smokingban
FIGURE 1
Geographical Distribution of SSB Membership
SSB Members
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(the PVV) during the 2006 national elections. These
were the last elections that took place before 2008,
the year for which we measured our dependent
variable. Even though the 2006 elections were na-
tional and not local, Dutch law requires people to
vote in their municipality of residence. Voters can
request a permit to vote in another municipality, but
less than 0.1% of the voters do so. Therefore, the
outcomes of the national elections also provide
a very accurate reflection of the local political cli-
mate. The required information was obtained from
the official records of the Dutch elections and recal-
culated to reflect the 2010 municipal classification.
This measure showed considerable variation, rang-
ing between 5.7% and 38.7%.
Our third control variable captured the extent to
which there was local activism in favor of the
smoking ban. This level of local anti-smoking
activism was measured using the address informa-
tion of the signees of a petition in support of the
smoking ban initiative carried out in 2008, and pro-
vided to us by Clean Air Netherlands. This petition
was used in the lobbying efforts to convince indi-
vidual legislators and members of parliament of the
support for the smoking ban among the general
public, and included 54,045 signees. Many of them
FIGURE 2
Geographical Distribution of Fines for Violation of the Smoking Ban
Number of fines
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TABLE 4
Variables and Data Sources
Variable Measurement Data source(s)
Resistance to the smoking
ban
Number of pubs and bars in a municipality that
were members of the SSB foundation in 2008
Own computations based on the membership files of
the SSB foundation aggregated to the municipal
level (http://kleinehoreca.info/)
Fines for ban violation Number of fines levied in 2008–2009 by the VWA
for violating the smoking ban
Own computations based on data disclosed by the
VWA and supplied by LocalFocus (www.
localfocus.nl)
Community
cohesiveness–Residential
stability
Standardized and inverted share of people leaving
and entering a community in 2007
StatisticsNetherlands (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/)
Community
cohesiveness–Kinship
Average of 7-point Likert scale answers to 9 items:
(1) “I feel an attachment to this neighborhood,”
(2) “I feel at home in this neighborhood,” (3) “I
have a lot of contact with the people who live
next door,” (4) “I have a lot of contact with other
residents,” (5) “I feel responsible in part for the
neighborhood being a pleasant place to live,” (6)
“People are nice to each other in this
neighborhood,” (7) “I live in a pleasant
neighborhood with a sense of solidarity,” (8)
“People in this neighborhood hardly know each
other,” and (9) “I am satisfied with the
composition of the population in this
neighborhood”
Own computations based on data from the National
Housing Survey (WoonOnderzoek Nederland)
conducted by ABF research (http://www.
abfresearch.nl) and commissioned by Statistics
Netherlands
Community
contiguity–Resistance in
neighboring
municipalities
Spatially weighted average of the percentage of
pubs and bars in the neighboring municipalities
that were members of the SSB foundation in
2008
Owncalculations basedon themembership files of the
SSB foundation aggregated to the municipal level
(http://kleinehoreca.info/)
Number of pubs and bars Total number of pubs and bars in amunicipality in
2008
Obtained from the branch organization for hospitality
and catering (www.kenniscentrumhoreca.nl)
Political opposition to
smoking ban
Percentage of votes in themunicipality for the only
political party (PVV) that was opposed to the
smoking ban during the 2006 elections
Official records of the Dutch 2006 elections (www.
verkiezingskaart.nl)
Local anti-smoking activism Percentage of inhabitants of the municipality that
signed the petition in favor of the smoking ban in
bars and pubs in 2008
List of signees obtained from the initiator of the
petition, the Clean Air Netherlands foundation
(http://www.cleanairnederland.nl/). Thenumberof
signees was aggregated to the municipal level and
divided by the number of inhabitants (3 1,000) of
the municipality (obtained from Statistics
Netherlands, http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/)
Local competition Number of pubs and bars per 1,000 inhabitants in
the municipality in 2008
The numbers of pubs and bars per municipality were
obtained from the branch organization for
hospitality and catering (www.
kenniscentrumhoreca.nl). The number of
inhabitants (3 100) of the municipality was
obtained from Statistics Netherlands (http://
statline.cbs.nl/statweb/)
Local demand Percentage of inhabitants (15 years1) in the
municipality who are both daily smokers and
visit a bar or pub once a month or more (pooled
data for 2007 and 2008)
Own computations based on data from the
“continuous research on smoking habits”
conducted by TNS NIPO (http://www.tns-nipo.
com/) and commissioned by the Dutch center of
expertise for tobacco control STIVORO (http://
www.stivoro.nl/)
Population density Number of inhabitants in the municipality in 2008
divided by its surface area (measured in km2)
StatisticsNetherlands (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/)
Socioeconomic
development
Average gross household income (measured in
thousands of Euros) in the municipality in 2008
StatisticsNetherlands (http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/)
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(55.4%) provided a reason for signing the petition,
which allowed us to checkwhether these signatories
really did support the smoking ban. We randomly
selected 10% of all petitioners who provided a rea-
son for signing (2,995 cases) and checked their mo-
tives for signing the petition. While the stated
reasons for signing ranged from practical or personal
health reasons to ideological positions about free-
dom from externalities imposed by others, the vast
majority (99.5%) was indeed in favor of the smoking
ban. Moreover, in order for their signature to be
considered valid, signees had to list their place of
residence—which could, for our purposes, be di-
rectly linked to municipalities. Our measure of local
anti-smoking activismwas calculated as the number
of signees permunicipality divided by the number of
residents of that municipality (data obtained from
Statistics Netherlands).
We also controlled for two economic pressures on
bars within a community; namely, the level of local
competition and the level of local demand from
smokers. The level of local competition was mea-
sured as the number of pubs and bars in a munici-
pality per 1,000 residents in 2008. The former
information was obtained from the branch organi-
zation for hotels, restaurants, cafes, and catering (see
Table 4),while the latterwas obtained fromStatistics
Netherlands. For a few municipalities, particularly
the islands in the north of the Netherlands that have
high levels of tourism, this measure yielded rela-
tively high scores. Overall, however, the measure
was more or less normally distributed.
The level of local demand was measured as the
percentage of residents of the municipality that
were both daily smokers and visited a bar or pub
at least once a month. To compute this variable,
we obtained the micro data from the “continuous
research on smoking habits” commissioned by
STIVORO (the central coordinating organization
for smoking cessation in the Netherlands) and
conducted by one of the leading Dutch market re-
search institutes (TNS NIPO). This yearly phone
survey encompasses roughly 18,000 respondents.
Its stratified random sampling design ensures rep-
resentativeness at themunicipal level if onepools at
least two years of data. The research is co-funded by
Statistics Netherlands and is also used to generate
the official statistics regarding smoking behavior.
We pooled data from the data collection waves of
2007 and 2008 and extracted the information re-
garding smoking behavior andbar visiting behavior.
After accounting for missing data, the sample con-
tained 33,367 valid observations. For each of these
observations, we dummy coded whether the re-
spondent was both a daily smoker and visited a bar
at least once a month (score 5 “1”) or not (score 5
“0”). Subsequently, we calculated the mean score
on this dummy variable for each municipality.
We also controlled for the population density,
measured as the number of people per square kilo-
meter in the municipality, to differentiate between
urban and rural areas. Note that this variable also
picks up the effects of many other community-level
characteristics, such as availability of cultural ame-
nities, crime rates, health care access, and so on.
These variables correlate problematically highly
with each other when used simultaneously in sta-
tistical analyses. Instead of compiling a difficult-to-
interpret composite index, we opted to use a single
indicator that reflected the majority of these
between-community differences. We used pop-
ulation density rather than absolute population, as
there were significant variations in the surface areas
of municipalities. The information necessary to
compute this variable was obtained from Statistics
Netherlands.
Finally, we controlled for the level of socioeco-
nomic development in the municipality, measured
as the average household income in the commun-
ity. Again, this variable picks up almost all variation
between communities relating to socioeconomic
features such as education levels, unemployment
rates, real estate prices, and so on. Instead of com-
piling a difficult-to-interpret composite index, we
opted to use a single indicator that reflected the ma-
jority of these between-community differences. The
information required to calculate this variable was
obtained from Statistics Netherlands, which com-
putes it as the total gross income ina regiondividedby
the number of households in the region.
Statistical Analyses
We used a negative binomial regression model to
estimate the effects of our independent variables on
the level of resistance to the smoking ban. Note that,
due to the inclusion of the spatial lag of the de-
pendent variable in our models, econometrically,
our models are negative binomial spatial-lag models
(Doh & Hahn, 2008). The choice of this model was
governedby thedistributionof thedependentvariable,
which is a count variable with a highly non-normal
distribution that rules out conventional ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression models (Verbeek, 2004). For
count data, the family of Poisson regression models
is most applicable (Long, 1997), but, given that our
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dependent variable is also characterized by over-
dispersion (variance5 17.56;mean5 2.45), which is
problematic for the regular Poisson model (Hilbe,
2007), the negative binomial model was the most
suitable type of statistical analysis. We estimated all
models using robust standard errors.
Before estimating our models, we log-transformed
all independent and control variables. We did so
for two reasons. First, all variables exhibited a sig-
nificant degree of skewness, which is reduced by
log-transformation. Second, log-transforming these
variables has the advantage that the regression co-
efficients can be interpreted as elasticities (Hilbe,
2007). However, an important characteristic of the
negative binomial model is that it has a multiplica-
tive rather than an additive model specification
(Hilbe, 2007), implying that the impact of a change in
an independent variable on the dependent variable
depends on the values on all other independent
variables. In order to provide insights into the mag-
nitude of the effects of our independent variables,we
conducted marginal effects analyses. The effects
that we report reflect the average elasticity of the
independent variable across all observed values for
the other variables in the model (Hoetker, 2007).
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and pairwise correla-
tions between all of the variables, including the
control variables, are presented in Table 5. Several
interesting results stand out. First, more than 12% of
the bars were members of the SSB, which is quite
a substantial proportion. Second, as expected, there
is a moderately strong correlation between the
number of pubs and bars in a region and the re-
sistance to the smoking ban (0.68). This correlation
underlines the need to include the potential number
of resistors as a control variable. Besides this corre-
lation, however, all correlations are of modest size,
indicating that there are no multicollinearity prob-
lems in the data. Third and finally, there is a positive
but relatively low (0.26) correlation between our two
dimensions of social cohesion. This substantiates
our arguments that these are twodistinct dimensions
of social cohesion. Moreover, this low correlation is
in linewith earlier empiricalwork that examined the
relation between these two community characteris-
tics and found no relation between the two after
controlling for other community characteristics
(Tolsma et al., 2009).
We estimated negative binomialmodels to test our
hypotheses. Model 1 is the baseline model, in which
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only the control variables are included, and serves
to evaluate the added explanatory value of the in-
dependent variables. Model 2 adds the three direct
effects of the independent variables, and serves to
test Hypotheses 1–3. Models 3 and 4 test the in-
teraction effects between each of the two dimensions
of community cohesiveness and the level of re-
sistance in neighboring municipalities. Model 5, fi-
nally, simultaneously tests both interaction effects.
The results of these models are reported in Table 6.
Table 6 reveals that all models are highly significant
andthatallexhibitabettermodel fit (significantly lower
log-likelihoods) than the baselinemodel. Furthermore,
the a parameter, which corrects for the overdispersion
of the dependent variable, is highly significant in all
models, indicating that the negative binomial model
was indeed the appropriate estimation technique.
Model 1 shows that most control variables have sig-
nificant effects on the level of resistance, the only ex-
ception being the level of socioeconomic development.
Asexpected, thenumberofpubsandbars inaregionhas
a strong positive effect on the level of resistance. This
effect suggests that the larger the pool of potential re-
sistors, the higher the level of resistance. More specifi-
cally, an increase in the number of bars in a community
by 1% increases the level of resistance by 0.274%.
Moreover, the higher the share of voters for the PVV
inamunicipality, thehigher the levelof resistance to the
smoking ban.The effect size reported inTable 6 implies
that an increase in the share of PVV voters in a munici-
palityby1%corresponds toanincreaseof theresistance
to the smokingbanby0.435%.Moreover,we found that
thehigher thepopulationdensity in thecommunity, the
higher the level of resistance (elasticity of 0.509).
The results show, too, that the higher the level of
anti-smoking activism in a municipality, the lower
will be the resistance to the smoking ban: an increase
of 1% in the share of the population in a community
that signed the petition in favor of the smoking ban is
associated with, on average, 0.309% less resistance
to the smoking ban in the community.
Both the level of competition bars face and the
level of demand originating from smokers have
a positive association with the level of resistance to
the smoking ban in a community. With regard to the
level of competition, we found that an increase of the
level of competition of 1% is related to an increase in
the resistance in the community of 1.129%, and an
increase in the share of demand that originates from
smokers by 1% is associated with 0.120% more re-
sistance among bars in the community.
Model 2 shows that an increase in community
residential stability of 1% corresponds to an increase
in resistance to the smoking ban of 0.484%, thereby
confirming Hypothesis 1. For the degree of kinship in
a community, we also found a statistically significant
positive effecton the levelof resistance to the smoking
ban. In this case, an increase of 1% in the level of
kinship is associatedwith an increase in resistance to
the smoking ban of 1.901%, thereby confirming Hy-
pothesis 2. Finally, Model 2 also provides strong
support for Hypothesis 3: an increase in the level of
resistance in neighboring communities of 1% relates
to a 0.520% increase in resistance to the smoking ban.
The findings reported in Models 3–5 demonstrate
that the contiguity effect of resistance to the smoking
ban becomes stronger as community cohesiveness,
both in terms of residential stability and kinship,
decreases. We found this both in the partial models
(Models 3 and 4) as well as in the full model (Model
5), providing strong support for Hypotheses 4 and 5.
To make these interaction effects easier to interpret,
we estimated andplotted the level of resistance to the
smoking ban for all combinations of community co-
hesiveness and levels of resistance in neighboring
communities. Moreover, as point significance does
not imply significance over the whole range of the
variables in non-linear models (Hoetker, 2007), we
also created two plots in which the effect, including
the 95% confidence interval, of resistance in neigh-
boring communities is depicted for two different
levels of residential stability and kinship.
The results, as shown in Figures 3 and 5, clearly
demonstrate that, as predicted in Hypotheses 4 and 5,
the effect of resistance in neighboring communities is
much weaker for more cohesive communities. More-
over,Figures4and6also indicate that, for thelargestpart
of the range of resistance in neighboring communities,
the predicted level of resistance is significantly different
for different values of kinship/residential stability.
Note that Figures 3 and 5 also show that, when the
level of resistance to the smoking ban in neighboring
communities is low, a decrease in the focal com-
munity’s cohesiveness lowers the level of resistance
in it. In otherwords, low levels of cohesivenessmake
a community more susceptible and its boundaries
more permeable to ideas and opinions from neigh-
boring communities, regardless of whether these are
in favor of or against the smoking ban. This finding is
remarkably similar for both dimensions of commu-
nity cohesiveness in our study.
Robustness Checks
We performed several robustness checks to assess
the sensitivity of our findings to changes in variable
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specification and estimation methods. The results of
these robustness checks are reported in Table 7.
First, we estimated our full model excluding the
municipalities that did not have at least one bar
(four cases), based on the notion that, in such
municipalities, resistance cannot occur, given our
measure of it. The results of this analysis, reported in
Table 7, Model 6, yielded results nearly identical to
those reported in Table 6, indicating that our results
are not sensitive to this change.
TABLE 6
Negative Binomial Regression Models of Resistance to the Smoking Bana,b
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Control variables
Number of pubs
and bars
0.274** 0.073 0.256** 0.09 0.271** 0.097 0.284** 0.081 0.280** 0.081
Population
density
0.509** 0.087 0.445** 0.146 0.471** 0.133 0.446** 0.088 0.405** 0.095
Socioeconomic
development
20.663 0.933 20.895 0.806 21.448* 0.636 21.185 0.889 21.665* 0.781
Local anti-
smoking
activism
20.309* 0.144 20.246† 0.139 20.224† 0.118 20.336* 0.160 20.262† 0.158
Political
opposition to
smoking ban
0.354† 0.194 0.203 0.247 0.196 0.232 0.222 0.183 0.094 0.201
Local competition 1.290* 0.567 1.467** 0.521 1.432** 0.535 1.411** 0.532 1.527** 0.498
Local demand 0.120** 0.046 0.117* 0.051 0.109* 0.045 0.136* 0.054 0.111* 0.048
Independent
variables
Residential
stability
0.484* 0.231 1.096* 0.485 1.511** 0.551
Kinship 1.901* 0.915 0.620** 0.135 0.657** 0.173
Resistance in
neighboring
communities
0.520* 0.231 1.409** 0.471 0.591** 0.138 0.787** 0.203
Resistance in
neighboring
communities 3
Residential
stability
20.962* 0.434 21.345** 0.504
Resistance in
neighboring
communities 3
Kinship
20.245** 0.057 20.258** 0.073
Model
information
N 427 427 427 427 427
Model
significance
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a 0.260** 0.245** 0.252** 0.239** 0.228**
Log-likelihood 2722.41 2718.24 2717.68 2716.36 2711.17
x2Δ Log-
likelihood with
Model 1
— 8.39* 9.45* 12.08** 22.47**
a All reported standard errors are robust clustered standard errors at the provincial level.
b Reported coefficients reflect the average elasticity of the independent variable across all observed values for the other variables in the
model.
† p , .10
* p , .05
** p , .01
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Second, we ran our analyses with a different spec-
ification of the dependent variable. Instead of using
the absolute number of resistors, we calculated the
share of bars in the municipality that resisted by di-
viding the number of resistors by the total number of
bars in the municipality. The resulting variable was
highly skewed, so we log-transformed it and per-
formed an OLS regression with the same list of in-
dependent and control variables. Again, doing so
yielded substantively identical results to those re-
ported in Table 6 (see Table 7, Model 7).
Third, we checked whether our analyses were not
simply picking up whether there is resistance in
a region instead of the magnitude of resistance. To
assess this possibility, we excluded all cases in
which there was no resistance (126 cases) and re-ran
our negative binomialmodels (see Table 7,Model 8).
Again, the results obtained were similar to those re-
ported in Table 6. All the coefficients had the same
sign, but some of the significance levels did change
somewhat due to the large drop in the number of
observations.
Fourth, we ran our full model with the number of
fines given for violating the smoking ban as the de-
pendent variable (Table 7, Model 9). Again, the re-
sults are greatly similar to those reported in Table 6.
There are, however, twoexceptions to this similarity,
which strengthen our confidence in the validity of
our dependent variable. These exception are the
positive effect of the level of anti-smoking activism
(negative in all other models) and the negative effect
of the level of political opposition to the smoking ban
(positive in all other models). These exceptions are
very logical, based on the process of how bars were
selected for inspection by the VWA. Being un-
derstaffed, the VWA largely relied on tips from pa-
trons to inspect bars violating the smoking ban.
So, the number of inspections and fines in a munici-
pality would depend on, among other things, the
willingness of barpatrons to snitch to theVWA.Anti-
smoking activists are probablymore likely to do this,
whereas voters for the only political party against the
smoking ban are less likely to do so.
Fifth, we checked whether our results would still
apply with a different specification of the spatial
lag variable. Instead of using a quadratic distance
decay function to calculate the spatial lag, we use
a contiguity-basedmeasure in which only the scores
of directly neighboring regions were taken into ac-
count in the spatial lag measure. Model 10 of Table 7
reveals that doing so yields oncemore greatly similar
results to those reported in Model 5 (Table 6).
Finally, we re-estimated our full model with
a control for population size instead of population
FIGURE 3
Interaction Effect of Residential Stability and Resistance in Neighboring Communities
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density. Inprincipal, population size andpopulation
density are not necessarily related to each other.
Even though, in the context of Dutch communities,
they correlate with 0.73, we performed this robust-
ness test to rule out the possibility that the specifi-
cation of this control variable influenced our results.
Model 11 inTable 7 reveals that thiswas not the case.
Overall, we find that our results are highly robust
to changes in the model specification as well as
changes in the specification of key variables in the
model.
DISCUSSION
Small bars embedded in communities that exhibit
greater residential stability and kinship, together
constituting a higher level of community cohesion,
resisted institutional pressure from the state more
than their counterparts located in less cohesive
communities. This finding incorporates three
components—small organizations, community co-
hesion, andapowerful adversary—that togetherpoint
toward the key discovery of this study. It was indeed
the interrelation among the bars and their cohesive,
supportive community that provided the founda-
tion for these powerless organizations to resist state
regulations. With the enforcement of strong in-
stitutional pressures that are seen as harmful to
members of a community, the social cohesion of
a community might be even further increased (e.g.,
Sampson, 1991) and offer relatively powerless ac-
tors strong arms with which to oppose a regulatory
force. In this section, we discuss, first, how we see
this study in the context of research on institutional
processes in and across communities, followed by
the novelty and significance of our David-versus-
Goliath scenario and findings, and conclude with
some observations concerning resistance exhibited
in the specific context of smoking and smoking
control.
Communities are important social arenas for in-
stitutional processes, yet they have attracted scarce
theoretical and empirical attention (Marquis et al.,
2007). They are meaningful in that they are assumed
to be relatively homogeneous with respect to a vari-
ety of economic, social, and cultural characteristics,
and are more likely to share prospects and fates as
compared to society as a whole (e.g., Brint, 2001).
FIGURE 4
The Effect of Resistance in Neighboring Communities for Two Levels of Residential Stability
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Significant processes of conformity and contention
over actions, regulations, and norms take place at the
community level, but to date have received in-
sufficient attention from institutional scholars. This
paper addresses such processes in Dutch communi-
ties (municipalities), and finds support for the notion
that communities’ distinctive local endowments, as
expressed in their social cohesion, matter and in-
fluence local organizations’ actions above and be-
yond a multitude of other factors. In particular, the
present research focuses onorganizations’ resistance
to a regulative change as exemplified by bars’ oppo-
sition to, and active defiance of, a complete ban on
smoking on their premises that was imposed by the
Dutch government. The criticality of local protest
and activism was demonstrated in Ingram, Yue, and
Rao’s (2010) study, but their focuswas different from
ours. Their study established the importance of local
sources of resistance to a change that would affect
the community (the proposed establishment of a
Wal-Mart store), whereas we focus on the struggle
between the state and small businesses as they occur
within the boundaries of distinct local social enti-
ties. Our contribution is thus “bringing the commu-
nity [back] in” to the discussion and analyses of
institutional processes, in particular when contes-
tation is involved. Regardless of whether the in-
stitutional pressure originates from the state or other
actors, we theorize and show that the heterogeneous
responses of organizations to such pressures origi-
nates from their embeddedness, in particular, and
different local social settings. As Ingram et al. (2010:
84) asserted, “protests are not distributed randomly
across communities,” and we show empirically that
the degree of a community’s cohesiveness varies as
do other community attributes, and claim that the
level of resistance from small powerless organiza-
tions is determinedby that—that is, the community’s
overall social endowment as well as its specific local
economic features. As such, we suggest that re-
sistance is not a “narrow strategic response”
(Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007: 815), but should be
understood instead as being actively shaped by
and embedded in social structures.
In our case, the social structures are local com-
munities that facilitate, support, and even stimulate
the resistance by small bar owners against a power-
ful actor.We demonstrated that community cohesion
is a multidimensional construct that consists of
the residential stability, fostering a latent relational
FIGURE 5
Interaction Effect of Kinship and Resistance in Neighboring Communities
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infrastructure in the community, and kinship, which
generates a sense of belonging and care for the com-
munity. A highly cohesive community has more im-
pervious boundaries that are less open or receptive to
external information, ideas, andvalues. It is important
to reiterate that we distinguished between the
“physical permeability” of a community boundary,
which means that the likelihood of ideas being
“physically carried in” is reduced due to less move-
ment of residents across shared boundaries, and the
“cognitive permeability” of a community boundary,
which refers to the strong sense of belonging to a par-
ticular community and the accompanying normative
framework that limits the utilization of ideas, norms,
and values from beyond the community’s boundary.
Whereas institutional scholars have predominantly
investigated the ideational or symbolic aspects of
institutional pressures (see Jones, Boxenbaum, &
Anthony, 2013; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012), our
study shows that structural features, herein repre-
sented by the social boundary of a community, are
equally important in understanding responses to
institutional pressures.
Moreover, a focus on the geographyof institutional
resistance stems from a model that depicts the com-
munity as a meaningful level of analysis. If commu-
nities vary with respect to the level of resistance to
institutional pressures,while, at the same time, these
communities are embedded in a larger social con-
text, and are thus affected by it, then both concepts
should be taken into account, as we have done here,
when studying both resistance and mimetic behav-
ior. Adding the specific geographical consideration
requires scholars to better identify the underlying
reasons for resistance before arguing for and empir-
ically testing institutional processes. The value of
combining the spatial approach with a community’s
social characteristics is further demonstrated by the
results of the interaction terms in our study that
showed the contiguity effects of resistance from
neighboring communities diminishing when the fo-
cal community was more cohesive, for both dimen-
sions of cohesion.
It is common in analyses of institutionalization
processes to focus on “successful” institutionaliza-
tions, especially sowhen the source of thepressure is
FIGURE 6
The Effect of Resistance in Neighboring Communities for Two Levels of Kinship
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the state (see Dobbin & Sutton, 1998; Tolbert &
Zucker, 1983). In the Netherlands, the debate over
the anti-smoking ban as it applied to bars continued
to evolve even after the legislation took effect in July
2008. Contestation over the regulation involved not
only parliamentary debates and animated media
coverage but moved into the courts as well. In Feb-
ruary 2009, owners of the Cafe´ de Kachel in Gro-
ningen (in the north of theNetherlands)were the first
individuals found guilty of repeated violations of the
anti-smoking ban in a criminal court, and the barwas
ordered to close for one month. The criminal prose-
cution of other bar owners followed. With financial
support from the SSB, however, the owners of Cafe´
de Kachel and several other bars appealed their
sentences (Gonzalez & Glantz, 2011: 10). Because of
the ongoing litigation, the Minister of Health was
asked by other members of parliament to exempt
owner-run venues, and, in 2009, enforcement by
the VWA was suspended in owner-run bars without
employees (Gonzalez & Glantz, 2011). In May 2009,
a Dutch appeals court ruled that small bars with no
staff except their owners were exempt from the ban,
as the Dutch ban had been based on the right of em-
ployees to work in a smoke-free environment. On
February 23, 2010, though, the Supreme Court
overturned the lower court’s appeal and ruled that
there will be no exceptions to the smoking ban; ap-
proximately 10,000 establishments were directly
affected and had to implement the smoking ban in
full. However, the new government that was formed
after the 2010 elections agreed to exempt small bars.
Consequently, on November 2, 2010, the new Min-
ister of Health, Edith Schippers, announced that she
would no longer enforce the smoking ban for small
bars (under 70 m2) without staff. A 2012 study from
the VWA concluded that, in 80%of these small bars,
customers were smoking again (VWA, 2012).
Hence, this study illustrates a case in which the
state was unsuccessful in imposing regulations on
small business organizations. The role of govern-
ment and the impact of its policies have been fre-
quently studied (e.g., Carroll, Goodstein, & Gyenes,
1988; Dobbin & Dowd, 1997), but the complexity of
its interaction with various affected parties has been
underestimated. Vermeulen, Bu¨ch, and Greenwood
(2007) demonstrated the failure of the Dutch gov-
ernment to create a market in the concrete industry,
but, in their case, the government used voluntary
agreements and the actors involvedwere large firms.
Other studies have shown that corporate actors
prove far from powerless in the face of regulatory
forces (e.g., Deephouse, 1999; Schneiberg & Bartley,
2001) and are capable of active resistance by estab-
lishing a broad coalition of established players in the
field. Our example is especially noteworthy, given
that the organizations in question are not giant
businesses with very deep pockets and throngs of
lobbyists but small bars, owner-run establishments.
As described above, they were able to challenge the
regulations and prevailed. This outcome provides
additional support to the idea that social context
matters, and that when an organization, however
small, serves an important social function in its
community and joins forces with other, similar or-
ganizations in its immediate environment, it can
exert power and influence above and beyond its net
economic contribution and/or value, even in the face
of strong institutional pressures.
Moreover, considering the nature of the actors and
their relative position in an institutional field, this
study’s context and ultimately its results provide
a compelling “mirror image” to Durand and
Jourdan’s (2012) study focusing on alternative
conformity. It reflects the role of “secondary” re-
source providers (minority logic holders) in in-
ducing alternative conformity among organizations,
thus highlighting the possibility that, in addition to
organizations’ adherence to pressures emanating
from primary resource providers, the effect of the
peripheral sources of pressures in an industry,
which, over time, may also contribute to a change in
the “rules of the game,” shouldn’t be neglected. In
our study, we focus on organizations (not pressure-
producing actors) that are small and arguably pe-
ripheral in the overall industry (hospitality), and on
(ultimately successful) resistance (not conformity) to
a powerful actor—the state. Taken together, these
two studies highlight the crucial role of the more
marginal actors (source of pressure or recipient) in
affecting institutional change over time. This area
has not received sufficient attention to date, and
opens up new opportunities to provide theoretical
nuance and precision in the study of institutional
dynamics.
The points discussed above are even more signif-
icant given the issue that is being contested. The
harmful consequences of tobacco use and of expo-
sure to tobacco smoke are scientifically well foun-
ded, and have been so for some time. Consequently,
the various policies and measures taken since the
1970s to eliminate those effects, certainly in the de-
veloped countries, are also widespread and taken as
noncontroversial—in short, they are seen as in-
stitutionalized. The findings of our study tell us
something about howsome issuesmight possibly not
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be institutionalized even if on the face of it they are.
This may indicate that, in the conceptualization
and empirical investigation of institutionalization as
a process as well as of its outcomes, we should dig
deeper to discover undercurrents that continue to
churn and trigger resistance to a given regulation,
norm, or social expectation. A confluence of in-
terests and beliefs, as expressed by a variety of actors
such as businesses, politicians, NGOs, the media,
and individuals, together contributing to a height-
ened institutional complexity can possibly un-
dermine even what on the surface seems like highly
institutionalized regulations or sets of practices.
A unique feature of the present study is that we
could directly measure its central concept, resis-
tance to change, which is rarely done in institutional
studies on resistance (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).
The resisting organizations took an active step,
joined the SSB group (which costs 250 Euros),
and openly defied the smoking ban (“You probably
have already heard about the lawsuit against us.
We ask all of you to support us in any way you can,
so we will not bear the brunt of this ridiculous
policy of our Minister. We will fight it until the
bitter end”; owners of the Cafe´ de Kachel on their
blog). The use of such directmeasures increases the
external validity of our findings and our confidence
in the relationships that became evident in the an-
alyses. It is also instructive to highlight the control
variables, which, while their specific effects were
not hypothesized, nonetheless provide additional
evidence of the importance of the community as
a level of analysis—communities vary on multiple
dimensions, even beyond the predictable economic
variation. Additionally, all control variables’ effects
were in the expected direction, as explained in the
results section, supporting the significance of
a community’s social cohesion when theorizing
about organization resistance. That is, the commu-
nity cohesion’s effect holds even when intra-
community attitudes varied with respect to smoking
bans, thus providing an indication of a hierarchy of
values; when one central value shared by most is
threatened, other values, which may exhibit a higher
level of disparity, become secondary to the issue at
hand.
While this study has a number of important
strengths, there are some boundary conditions to
review. First, our theory predominantly applies to
organizations that are small and relatively power-
less actors. Larger andmore powerful organizations
probably have a different range of responses at
their disposal and may be less dependent on their
community for support. Second, in our study, the
institutional pressure came from a powerful and
highly legitimate actor, the Dutch national govern-
ment. If the pressure were to stem from weaker and
less legitimate actors, resistance may be less risky,
which, in turn, is likely to alter the role of commu-
nity endowments in the rise of resistance. Third, our
theoretical arguments are applicable to situations in
which institutional pressures threaten the norma-
tive framework of the community; however, in
cases in which institutional pressures do not di-
rectly threaten the normative framework of a com-
munity, it is unlikely thatweak actors, such as small
bars, could rally enough support to successfully
resist the pressure.
Another boundary condition of our work pertains
to the level of traction on the causal mechanisms at
work. The time lag in ourdata structure, the temporal
stability of the community characteristics, and the
supportive qualitative evidence make reverse cau-
sality rather implausible. Nonetheless, future work
could benefit fromobtaining and analyzing data over
longer periods of the dynamics of organizations’ re-
sistance to regulatory pressures at the community
level. Data availability and the turn of events (i.e., the
success of the small bars’ resistance) prevented us
from having access to such data. It would be in-
teresting and informative, however, to document
how the positions and achievements of contesting
parties change over time, and whether different
community characteristics matter more or less at
different points in time. Additionally, having more
fine-grained measures of local social endowments
could help in further disentangling the various
drivers of community-level resistance. An example,
related to the dynamic aspect mentioned above,
would be to include the history of community ac-
tivism. A community with a rich, spirited history of
involvement in protests or campaigns on issues re-
lating to local concerns may be better positioned to
face any newchallenges that requiremobilization; in
other words, it has built a community activism en-
dowment over time. This would also be a way to
ameliorate a remaining causality problem in our
study, that of simultaneity. There might be a (histor-
ically developed) common factor that influences
both the level of social cohesion and the level of
resistance in a community. We tried to rule out such
common factors by controlling for many other com-
munity characteristics, but cannot rule out that
there may be community characteristics, (specifi-
cally, historically determined intangible factors)
that we may have omitted. If information on the
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development of activism endowment and the type of
issues that were addressed could be obtained, then it
should become possible to determine whether this
endowment is general in nature (i.e., the more in-
volvement in past protestation, the more likely fu-
ture activity will be) or if future involvement is issue
specific (i.e., there needs to be some affinity between
past and future issues inorder to trigger involvement).
An examination of these questions could address the
uncertainties concerning communities’ capacity to
organize and how this might alter the interactions
between communities and organizations functioning
and residing in them.
Future research could also look at other types of
communities, such as virtual or open-source com-
munities, that also exhibit a collective sense of “we-
ness” (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). These are
normally well-organized communities with estab-
lished communication channels, and, in a prior study
on open-source software communities (Linux user
groups), the importance of ideology and shared values,
rituals, and traditions was demonstrated (Bagozzi &
Dholakia, 2006). Such groups are often also small
and powerless communities thatmay have to stand up
to large corporations (our “David vs. Goliath” sce-
nario), and so the present study’s results may be gen-
eralizable to various such communities assuming that
they share some of the features we found to be signifi-
cant. Finally, from a practical perspective, our study’s
findings suggest that it is advisable for managers to be
familiar with the characteristics of the community in
which their organizations operate, as community
characteristics in general, and cohesion in particular,
may have a substantial impact on organizations’ ac-
tivities and fates.
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